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Environments in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are changing as the design of instrumenta-
tion and control systems for NPPs is rapidly moving toward fully digital instrumentation
and control, and modern computer techniques are gradually introduced into main control
rooms (MCRs). Within the context of these environmental changes, the level of perfor-
mance of operators in a digital MCR is a major concern. Situation awareness (SA), which is
used within human factors research to explain to what extent operators of safety-critical
systems know what is transpiring in the system and the environment, is considered a
prerequisite factor to guarantee the safe operation of NPPs. However, the safe operation of
NPPs can be guaranteed through a team effort. In this regard, the operating team's SA in a
conventional and digital MCR should be measured in order to assess whether the new
design features implemented in a digital MCR affect this parameter. This paper explains
the team SA measurement method used in this study and the results of applying this
measurement method to operating teams in different MCR environments. The paper also
discusses several empirical lessons learned from the results.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
As digital technology develops, main control rooms (MCRs) of
new nuclear power plants (NPPs) are planning to adopt
computer-based humanesystem interfaces (HSIs). New MCRs. Seong).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behahave sit-down workstations from which operating personnel
monitor the plant through computerized displays. Operators
control the plant's equipment using soft controls that are
accessed through computer workstations, and use computer-
based procedures (CBPs) that offer the potential to undertakeCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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semiautomated control measures where the operator autho-
rizes the procedure to perform a series of actions [1]. An
operator can also approach all the information and operating
procedures using a computerized procedure system, which
allows them to share the same information with the senior
reactor operator.
While the introduction of advanced HSIs is generally
considered to enhance operator performance, there is also the
potential to negatively impact human performance, spawn
new types of human errors, and reduce human reliability [2].
Moreover, it becomes possible for the performance of the
team to be degradedwhen they engage inmore personal tasks
[3]. Thus, addressing human performance issues with new
HSIs in NPPs is critical for the successful introduction of new
HSIs [4,5].
To shed light on these issues, various studies have been
carried out. For example, numerous studies regarding human
factors in the nuclear industry have been conducted in rela-
tion to the Halden Reactor Project [6e8]. Moreover, prototypes
of different design concepts of advanced HSIs have been
implemented in the experimental control room facility of the
Halden Reactor Project, and the effects on the operator per-
formance have been evaluated through performance-based
tests [9]. Furthermore, various factors that can affect human
performance in an advanced MCR were derived as part of an
effort to develop a human reliability method for an advanced
MCR [10]. Along with these efforts, many researchers are
working to develop appropriate performance measures to
evaluate the effects of these advanced HSIs [11e15]. Among
the suggested performance measures, situation awareness
(SA), which is used within human factors research, to explain
to what extent operators of safety-critical systems knowwhat
is transpiring in the system and the environment, is consid-
ered an important human performance measure, as SA dic-
tates the ability to initiate correct actions given a particular
situation and to respond properly to system feedback. In this
light, SA continues to receive a considerable amount of
attention from the ergonomics community, as insight can be
gained into human information processing during in-
teractions with dynamic and complex environments [16,17].
To date, measurement and assessment technologies for
team performance are insufficient compared to those for in-
dividual performance [18]. Specifically for SA, much effort has
been devoted to developing a measurement method and
evaluating individual SA.
Although individual SA is important, most work is not
done in isolation, but rather takes place in groups or in a team
environment. Hence, much attention has been given to
measuring the operating team's SA as the team is recognized
as a key factor in safety-critical systems. Especially in the
nuclear domain, team SA has received growing attention in
light of the finding that MCR operators perform diagnostic
tasks as a teamunit so that NPPs can be safe. To resolve issues
pertaining to human performance, specifically “team SA,” this
study aims to measure the SA of an operating team, as it
operates anMCRwith newHSIs implemented, and to compare
the results with those from a conventional MCR. First, this
paper briefly explains the method used to measure the oper-
ating team's SA, as developed in a previous study [19]. Second,this paper shows the result of an additional case study to
confirm the applicability of the method. Finally, the results of
the operating team's SA in different MCR environments are
shown, and several empirical lessons learned from this study
are discussed.2. Method for measuring an operating
team's SA
2.1. Brief description of the method
As shown in Fig. 1, the concept of team SA in this method is
mainly based on the concept derived by Endsley [20], who
defines SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their
meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.” For a
brief description of the SA concept, it has three generic as-
pects that are related to cognition: perception, comprehen-
sion, and projection. Level 1 SA, which implies perception,
includes the outcome of all top-down and bottom-up
perceptual processes. Thus, Level 1 SA addresses the extent
to which elements are detected. Level 2 SA, which implies
comprehension, includes the outcome of higher cognitive
processes. Level 2 SA refers to an understanding of the
meaning of the attended information. Level 3 SA, which im-
plies projection, describes an operator with the highest un-
derstanding of a situation, in that the operator can forecast
how the situation will develop. Endsley [20] refers to these as
the three levels of SA, and forms a three-level hierarchy with
Level 1 as the lowest, basic level and Level 3 as the highest
level. This method conceptualizes team SA based on the
concept of individual SA, as team SA also involves the team's
assessment (perception, comprehension, and projection) of
the current situation, including the surrounding environment,
the task, and the team itself. Similar to Endsley's [20] concept,
this method considers that team SA has three levels of SA,
forming a three-level hierarchy with Level 1 as the lowest,
basic level and Level 3 as the highest level.
The proposed method starts with the conceptualization of
team SA. There is some debate over the concept of team SA,
and there remains no universally accepted definition. How-
ever, this method considers team SA as the sum of individual
SA instances, independent of any overlap in SA requirements
among operators based on research results, suggesting that
“team SA can be the sum of the SA for each individual” [21].
Although the process of conceptualizing total team SA needs
to be more sophisticated with a consideration of the complex
relationships or hierarchies of individual operators, the pro-
posed method focuses on measuring team SA, treating it as
the final product of a complex process, rather than on
modeling team SA.
Based on the concept of team SA, the proposed method
makes logical connections between team communication and
team SA. From the results of a literature review from various
domains, the method is based on the assumption that team
communication is closely linked to team SA in that team
communication supports the knowledge-building and
information-processing activities that lead to the construction
Fig. 1 e Endsley's three-level SA model. SA, situation awareness.
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communication as a teamwork process.
The proposed method develops a logical connection be-
tween team communication and team SA using a decision
ladder model developed to identify the decision-making pro-
cess of experienced workers at thermal power plants. A de-
cision ladder, as shown in Fig. 2, explains the information-
processing steps; it consists of boxes that correspond to
information-processing activities and circles that correspond
to the state of knowledge. The method adopts insights fromFig. 2 e Decision ladder model. cond., conditiothis model, which implies that the information-processing
activities, considered as cognitive activities, can be observed
from team communication. Consequently, themethod selects
the following cognitive activities from the decision ladder
model: activate, observe, identify, predict, evaluate options,
define, formulate, and execute.
Second, this method uses a mapping process between the
selected cognitive activities and each level of team SA, using
insights grained from research on railway systems, which
attempted to understand how all the elements in the driver'sn; Observ., observation; proc., procedure.
Fig. 3 e High-level of tasks of approaching and driving through junctions, and their task relationships to each other using
the demarcations within Endsley's model of SA. SA, situation awareness.
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As shown in Fig. 3, the railway system results, which show an
SA model of the driver and describe each of the individual
tasks in activity-flow diagrams, were adopted.
The proposedmethod uses insights suggesting that drivers
of trains need to engage in the cognitive activities of “identi-
fication” and “recognition” to have Level 1 SA, “identification”
and “determination” for Level 2 SA, and “prediction” for Level
3 SA. These results were considered during the development
of a logical connection between the selected cognitive activ-
ities and each level of team SA, assuming that specific
cognitive activities are required to achieve each level of team
SA, as shown in Table 1.
After deriving the cognitive activities required for each
level of team SA, the method implements a speech act coding
scheme, which is used to summarize and interpret process
tracing data and to capture the critical content in data and theTable 1 e Cognitive activities required for each level of
team SA.
Level of team SA Cognitive activities for team SA
Level 1 Observe
Level 2 Identify
Level 3 Predict, evaluate, define
SA, situation awareness.frequencies and patterns in transcriptions. Among the various
coding schemes suggested for the purpose of a verbal protocol
analysis, the speech act coding scheme [22] developed by the
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) was adopted
for this method, as shown in Table 2.
The method determines the relationships between the
subcategories in a speech act coding scheme and the cognitive
activities required for each level of team SA using the research
results of Hollnagel et al [23], as shown in Fig. 4.
As Fig. 4 shows, the method considers that the sub-
categories of the speech act coding scheme can be mapped
onto the cognitive activities required for each level of teamSA.
It was considered that the elements of “read,” “see,” and “look”
are required for the cognitive activity of “observe.” Given that
“observe” is the cognitive activity required for Level 1 team SA,
the method selects the subcategories of the speech act coding
scheme for Level 1 team SA. The method uses the same pro-
cess for Level 2 and Level 3 team SA. It should be noted that a
speech act coding category such as “Announcement” is
included in both Level 1 and Level 2 of team SA. This is
because operators who liaise between operating teams can
give specific information necessary for constructing Level 1
and Level 2 team SA, and play an important role in both of
them.
These results are shown in Table 3. As shown in Fig. 5,
the method was developed by logically connecting team SA
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team SA can be measured using Table 3. In addition, the
feasibility of the method was shown with verbal protocol
data gathered from a full-scope simulator [19]. Each level of
team SA was measured using Table 3, and the scores for the
overall level of team SA were compared with the operating
team's task performance scores, as measured by an operator
performance assessment system (OPAS). OPAS was origi-
nally developed by the Halden Human-Machine Laboratory
(HAMMLAB) of the organization of the economic co-opera-
tion and development (OECD) Halden Reactor Project, and
it combines advantageous elements of a task-analytic
modeling technique and subjective expert judgment.
In this study, OPAS is used, and includes the results of task
analysis and the derivation of ideal activities for the given
tasks that were performed by KAERI. It was shown that the
method generated a high correlation between the team SA
scores and the task performance scores. Therefore, the pro-
posed method can reasonably infer team SA.
Reasons for selecting this method can be given in a more
detailedmanner. Based on a review of these SAmeasurement
techniques, it was found that most are beset with flaws, and
there remains considerable debate over which of the avail-
able measures is most appropriate for assessing team SA
(TSA). It can be claimed that four key requirements should be
encompassed by the TSA measurement method. First, “con-
tinuity” should be considered. A TSA measurement method
should not interrupt the performance of a participant's pri-
mary task, as such an interruption disturbs the actual mea-
surement of TSA. Second, “objectivity” should be considered.
A measurement should not be based on a participant's recall,
as measuring TSA based on participant recall can be subjec-
tive. Third, “validity” should be considered. Constructs
making up a method should actually measure participants'
SA and not their memory. Furthermore, SA, as measured by a
given method, should have a certain level of correlation with
a participant's performance, as a high level of SA will likely
correlate with a high level of performance. Fourth, “sensi-
tivity” should be considered. As one of the reasons for the
focus on SA is its practical use in improving interface design,
a method should accurately detect changes in TSA caused by
different types of technologies. The method chosen in this
study canmeet these requirements. First, it can be stated that
this method can maintain “continuity” because no further
interruption during the operation team's simulation is
necessary. Second, the method can maintain “objectivity”
because the data analysis is performed after the simulation
and does not need to be based on participant recall. Third,
this method can maintain “validity.” As will be explained in
detail with the additional case study related to the proposed
method in Section 2.2, a high level of correlation exists be-
tween the total TSA scores and the operation team's perfor-
mance scores. This result infers that the proposed method is
feasible to some extent, thus providing evidence of its “val-
idity.” Finally, this method can maintain “sensitivity.” This
will also be shown by the experimental studies in Section 3,
the purpose of which was to measure an operation team's SA
in different MCR environments. The method presented here
can measure differences in TSA under different technical
situations.
Fig. 4 e Schematic diagram of various internal data processing mechanisms that can be applied to the steps of a decision
sequence.
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Although the results from a preliminary study showed that
the proposed method has a certain degree of feasibility, an
additional case study was required to assess the feasibility of
this method. First, we collected simulation data from nine
operating teams working in NPPs. A simulation was per-
formed on a full-scope simulator, which is a replica of theMCR
of a conventional 1,000 MWe pressurized water reactor with
traditional alarm tiles, indicators, trend recorders, and control
devices installed. Moreover, an interfacing system loss of
coolant accident (ISLOCA) scenariowas used, as in theNuclear
Regulatory Guides/Control Room-6208 (NUREG/CR-6208)
[24,25].
As this scenario requires the integration of multiple
symptoms across different systems, it is cognitively
demanding; thus, it is likely that the feasibility of the method
could be clearly shown in this way. To assist with the
comprehension of the scenario, a description of its main
features follows.
The scenario is an ISLOCA from a high-pressure reactor
coolant system (RCS) to a low-pressure residual heat removal
(RHR) system. Fig. 6 provides a simple diagram of the systems
involved in the scenario, and Fig. 7 briefly shows the sequence.
In this scenario, the RCS leak into the RHR eventually led to
an RHR pipe rupture in the auxiliary building, causing theTable 3 e Table used formeasuring each level of team SA.
Level of
team SA
Cognitive activities
for team SA
Speech act coding
scheme
Level 1 Observe Inquiry, announcement
Level 2 Identify Judgment, announcement
Level 3 Predict, evaluate, define Suggestion
SA, situation awareness.reactor coolant fluid to spill onto the floor of the auxiliary
building.
This scenario was designed to be difficult in terms of sit-
uation assessment. The objective is to create a situation
where the operating teams have to identify and isolate the
leak into the RHR without explicit procedural guidance.
While the emergency operation procedures include pro-
cedures for identifying and isolating an ISLOCA, it is possible
to create a situation where the operating teams could not
reach the appropriate procedure within the emergency oper-
ation procedure network, as the plant symptoms generated
early in the event are similar to the pattern of symptoms that
would be produced by a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) inside
the containment. By timing the dynamics of the event care-
fully, it is possible to create a situation where the emergency
operation procedures direct the operators to the procedure for
a LOCA inside the containment.
However, there is no explicit transition to the ISLOCA
procedure. The crews eventually reach a step in the procedure
that asks them to “try and identify and isolate the leakage.” It
is possible to observe the operating team's performance in a
situation where the procedure explicitly requires the oper-
ating team to identify and isolate the leak without more
detailed procedural guidance.
The operating teamhas to identify the ISLOCA into the RHR
when attempting to isolate the leak. The first alarms indicate
pressure, and the level decreases in the pressurizer. These are
soon followed by alarms indicating radiation inside the
containment. Radiation in the containment strongly indicates
an RCS leak directly in the containment caused by a leak into
the RHR. A relief valve in the RHR system vents to the pres-
surizer relief tank inside the containment. The pressurizer
relief tank eventually ruptures, resulting in radiation in the
containment. The operating team needs to recognize these
physical system interconnections in order to link the symp-
toms in the containment with a potential problem in the RHR.
Fig. 5 e Overview of the development process for a team SA measurement method. SA, situation awareness.
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need to take action to attempt to isolate the leak. The appro-
priate action that needs to be taken depends on the postulated
source of the leak. In the event, two hypotheses with regard to
the source of the leak are equally plausible in that they can
fully explain the available evidence. One is a failure of the two
isolation valves between the hot leg loop of the RCS system
and the RHR on the suction side of the RHR pump. This is the
event postulated. Given this hypothesis, the actions required
to isolate the leak are to call the auxiliary building to request
that the valves be re-energized, to verify that they are closed,
and to close them if they are not. The alternative hypothesis is
that there is a leak back from the RCS through a series of failed
check valves. Given this hypothesis, the leak could be isolated
by closing an isolation valve on the discharge side of the RHR
pump that is normally kept open.
Using this cognitively demanding scenario, a feasibility
study was performed. First, each level of team SA was
measured using Table 3, and scores of the total level of team
SA were compared with the operating team's task perfor-
mance scores, asmeasured by an OPAS. A correlation analysis
of operating teams' task performance scores and the scores of
the total level of teamSAwas performed based on the fact that
an operating team with a high level of team SA shows good
performance.
As shown in Fig. 8, the result shows a certain level of cor-
relation between performance scores and total team SAscores. From this result, we could assess the feasibility of this
method.3. Measuring an operating team's SA in
different environments
3.1. Description of the experiment
As described above, this method is mainly based on analyzing
verbal protocols from operators. For verbal protocol data from
a conventional MCR, data from experiments conducted by
KAERI were used [24]. With a full-scope simulator, which is a
replica of the MCR of a conventional 1,000 MWe pressurized
water reactor with traditional alarm tiles, indicators, trend
recorders, and control devices installed, KAERI undertook
experiments to observe the performance of an operating team
under off-normal situations in NPPs. A total of 12 operating
teams who are currently working in conventional control
rooms at existing NPPs participated in this study. For the ex-
periments, a LOCA scenario was used and all the communi-
cations from operators were recorded by audioevisual
recording facilities in the simulator.
For the verbal protocol data from an advanced MCR, we
collected 11 verbal protocol data from an advanced MCR
simulator equippedwith newHSIs. Themajor newHSIs of this
Fig. 6 e Simplified diagram of the target systems. CCW, component cooling water; PORV, pilot-operated relief valve;
PRT, pressurizer relief tank; RCP, reactor coolant pump; RHR, residual heat removal.
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formation system, a CBP, a soft controller, and an advanced
alarm system. For the experiments, a total of 11 operating
teams who are currently working in conventional control
rooms at existing NPPs participated. They had requisite
training and education on the new HSIs before the
experiments.Fig. 7 e Sequence of the ISLOCA scenario. ISLOCA, interfacing s
RCS, reactor coolant system; RHR, residual heat removal; RHRS,All the verbal protocol data from both MCRs were tran-
scribed, including the contents and the speakers, and the
speech act coding scheme developed by KAERI was encoded.
Using Table 3, the scores of each level of team SA were
measured and the total team SA scores were calculated by
summating each level of team SA.ystem loss of coolant accident; PRT, pressurizer relief tank;
residual heat removal system.
Fig. 8 e Overview of the development process for a team SA
measurement method. ISLOCA, interfacing system loss of
coolant accident; SA, situation awareness.
Fig. 10 e Comparison of the scores of the constituents of
Level 1 team SA in a conventional and advanced MCR.
MCR, main control room; SA, situation awareness.
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Fig. 9 shows the average scores for each level and the total
team SA for a conventional and advanced MCR. As shown in
Fig. 9, the operating team in the MCR with new HSIs had
higher scores by 56.16% for the total team SA compared to the
operating team in the conventional MCR. For each level of
team SA consisting of the total team SA, the operating team in
the advanced MCR had higher average scores. Specifically,
operating teams in the advanced MCR had higher scores by
37.54% for Level 1 teamSA, by 149.45% for Level 2 teamSA, and
by 11.11% for Level 3 team SA relative to the conventional MCR
case.
Fig. 10 shows the detailed results for Level 1 team SA. As
stated above, the scores of Level 1 team SA could bemeasured
using certain subcategories of the speech act coding scheme
such as “announcement,” “observation,” and “inquiry.” Fig. 10
shows the average scores of these subcategories. As shown in
Fig. 10, the average scores of the subcategories comprising
Level 1 team SA were higher in the advanced MCR with the
exception of “observation.” Examining the results in detail,
the average score for “announcement” was 156.62% higher,
while that for “inquiry” was 41% higher in the advanced MCR.
However, it was shown that the average score for “observa-
tion” was 71.57% lower in the advanced MCR relative to the
conventional MCR.Fig. 9 e Comparison results of the operating team's SA in a
conventional and advanced MCR. MCR, main control room;
SA, situation awareness.Fig. 11 shows the detailed results for Level 2 team SA. As
stated above, the scores of Level 2 team SA could bemeasured
using certain subcategories of the speech act coding scheme
such as “announcement” and “judgment.” Fig. 8 shows the
scores for these subcategories. As shown in Fig. 11, the
average scores of the subcategories comprising Level 2 team
SAwere higher in the advancedMCR. Specifically, the average
score was 156.62% higher for “announcement” and 75% higher
for “judgment” in the advanced MCR.
Fig. 12 shows the detailed results of Level 3 team SA. As
stated above, the scores for Level 3 team SA could be
measured using a certain subcategory of speech act coding
scheme such as “suggestion.” Fig. 12 shows the average scores
of this subcategory. As shown in Fig. 12, the average score of
the subcategory comprising Level 3 team SAwas higher in the
advanced MCR. When observing this result in detail, it was
found that the average score was 11.11% higher than
“suggestion.”Fig. 11 e Comparison of the scores of the constituents of
Level 2 team SA in a conventional and advanced MCR.
MCR, main control room; SA, situation awareness.
Fig. 12 e Comparison of the scores of the constituents of
Level 3 team SA in a conventional and advanced MCR.
MCR, main control room; SA, situation awareness.
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Generally, the average scores of the total team SA and each
level of team SA in the advanced MCR were higher than those
in the conventional MCR. This section discusses the results of
increases or decreases of the constituent factors for each level
of team SA, based on the observed operators' communications
during the experiments.
For the increase in the number of communications
regarding an “announcement” in an advanced MCR, it was
observed that the senior reactor operator (SRO)'s communica-
tion, which tends to entail the reading of high-level step titles
audibly so that other board operators can understand the goal,
as well as to attempt to keep the crew synchronized by calling
out important information for all board operators, contributed
to an increased number of “announcements” in the advanced
MCR. As operators in an advancedMCR can access information
individually, the SRO was concerned with distracted attention
with regard to the SRO's actions when performing the proce-
dure. The SRO in the advanced MCR tried to draw other board
operators' attention to the procedure to keep pace with the
SRO's actions. This does not imply that the SRO in the con-
ventional MCR did not have adequate communication
regarding “announcement,” but it appears that the difference
in the number of communications was partly due to concerns
raised over distraction of attention. The SRO in the advanced
MCR exerted more efforts to keep other operators synchro-
nized by communication regarding “announcement.” In addi-
tion, it appears that the SRO attempted to announce the status
of the plant to other operators more frequently, as the SRO in
this case can gain access to the plant's informationmore easily
than the SRO in the conventional MCR.
The capability of individual access to the information also
contributed to the communication regarding “observation.”
As shown in the results, there were relatively few communi-
cations regarding “observation” in the advanced MCR. It was
observed that communications to acquire new information
were reduced, as the degree of accessibility to information by
the operators has been changed. It was noted that thenecessity to send new information to the SRO and to other
board operators was reduced. Moreover, it appears that the
atmosphere increased the SRO's concern over distractions.
Regarding “inquiry,” the number of communications
increased in the advanced MCR despite concerns that the SRO
would not ask for information from other board operators. It
was expected that the number of communications would
decrease when the SRO is coping with an emergency situation
using the CBP, because the CBP has functions that can directly
provide information to the SRO. However, it was observed that
the SRO in the advanced MCR still asked for information from
the board operators to confirm what the SRO perceived from
the CBP. This implies that the SRO had more opportunities to
engage in communication regarding “inquiry” using other
HSIs as alternative information sources to reassess the in-
formation. Moreover, checking all the substeps of the CBP so
that the CBP can evaluate whether the higher-level steps are
satisfied or violated contributed to an increase in the number
of communications defined as “inquiry.” It was observed that
the SRO in the conventional MCR occasionally resolved and
performed the substeps without communication with others
when the SRO felt that the status of the plant was reasonable.
However, the SRO in the advanced MCR had to check all the
substeps with other board operators because the CBP requires
all the substeps to be conducted.
For communications regarding “judgment,” it is difficult to
determine that it was higher in the advanced control room,
because the average scores of the communication did not
show a significant difference. This appears to be a result of the
characteristics of the scenario used in this experiment.
Although the emergency operating procedure requires the
operator to diagnose the event, it does not require the oper-
ator's diagnostic process throughout the emergency operating
procedure. It was expected that the results comparing the
communication regarding “judgment” in these two MCRs
would show more pronounced differences on the basis of
scenarios describing abnormal situations. However, it was
observed that the operating teams with the highest level of
communication regarding “judgment” used multiple inde-
pendent sources of information to support judgments of the
situation.
A similar result was also obtained for the type of commu-
nication classified as “suggestion.”As the scenario used in this
experiment is relatively straightforward for the operators, the
number of communications suggesting alternative actions or
predicting the plant's status was not high. This implies that
further experimental studies with abnormal situations need
to be performed in order to assess the difference between the
Level 2 and Level 3 team SA, which involves higher cognitive
activity.
In conclusion, this study evaluated the effects of new HSIs
that are implemented in advanced MCRs on human perfor-
mance. To compare human performance, team SA is selected
as a performance measure, as “SA” is frequently used in
research on human factors to compare new design concepts,
and insight can be gained with regard to human information
processing during interactions with dynamic and complex
environments. Moreover, the concept of “team” was consid-
ered, because a safe operation of the tasks at NPPs can be
guaranteed through teamwork.
Nu c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 8 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 5 3e1 6 3 163In general, team SA in an advanced MCR was relatively
high, and the results from observations of the operator's
communication during the experiment showed that an in-
crease in the number of communications in the form of
“announcement” contributed to the increased Level 1 team SA
and Level 2 team SA in an advanced MCR. According to the
definition of each level of team SA used in this study, an
advanced MCR with new HSIs provides more information to
operators and thus achieves greater Level 1 team SA. Based on
this information, operators could achieve higher Level 2 team
SA, which means that operating teams would have
more situational knowledge for coping with emergency
situations. As the event scenario used in this experiment does
not place substantial demands on the operator's cognitive
activities, a difference in Level 3 team SA, which requires the
highest level of cognitive activity, was not clearly shown in
this study.Conflicts of interest
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